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ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN
CORPORATE ADMINISTRATION:
A NEW APPROACH
INTRODUCTION
Attorney-client privilege is heralded as one of the oldest common law
privileges for confidential communication.1 As noted by the United States
Supreme Court, attorney-client privilege encourages “full and frank
communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote[s]
broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of
justice.”2 However, as shown in instances when attorneys serve legal and
non-legal functions within corporations, these privileges lend themselves to
abuse.3 This abuse, in turn, reveals some of the fundamental pitfalls of
current legal standards for assessing attorney-client privilege within the
corporate sphere.4
As modern corporate counsels become evermore involved in business
operations, there is a burgeoning concern that lawyers within corporations,
performing legal and non-legal functions (as “hybrid counsel”5), will use
their dual roles as shields against discovery—invoking attorney-client
privilege to immunize otherwise unprotected communications. 6 This
overlap of responsibility presents serious implications where governmental
investigations are impeded by unnecessary roadblocks stemming from the
improper invocation of privilege. 7 At root is an amorphous privilege
1. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
2. Id. Similarly, the work product doctrine allows for the protection of “materials obtained or
prepared by an adversary’s counsel with an eye toward litigation.” Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S.
495, 511 (1947).
3. See Maura I. Stassberg, Privilege Can Be Abused: Exploring the Ethical Obligation to
Avoid Frivolous Claims of Attorney-Client Privilege, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 413, 473 (2007)
(citing F.D.I.C. v. Hurwitz, 384 F. Supp. 2d 1039 (S.D. Tex. 2005), rev’d in part, vacated in part
sub nom. F.D.I.C. v. Maxxam, Inc., 523 F.3d 566 (5th Cir. 2008); Cobell v. Norton, 213 F.R.D. 16
(D.D.C. 2003); Am. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., No. Civ.A. 98-1788, 1999 WL
816300 (E.D. La. Oct. 7, 1999)).
4. Rather than provide a broad survey of attorney-client privilege rules, this Note focuses
exclusively on attorney-client privilege standards as applied in federal courts.
5. This Note refers to in-house counsel that performs legal and non-legal functions as “hybrid
counsel.” One common example is General Counsel serving as Chief Compliance Officer.
6. See Letter from Chuck Grassley, Senator, to Trevor Fetter, Chairman, Tenet Healthcare
Corporation (Sept. 8, 2003), available at
http://www.finance.senate.gov/newsroom/chairman/release/?id=25d04c0d-c7ab-4f00-b4ff-
292c2fa6d815 (“Apparently, neither Tenet nor Ms. Sulzbach saw any conflict in her wearing two
hats as Tenet’s general counsel and chief compliance officer . . . . It doesn’t take a pig farmer from
Iowa to smell the stench of conflict in that arrangement.”).
7. This is evident by virtue of the fact that the Department of Justice has consistently
encouraged and provided incentives for corporations that waive attorney-client privilege or
voluntarily disclose relevant facts and evidence. See Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Deputy
Attorney Gen., Dep’t of Justice, to All Component Heads and United States Attorneys: Bringing
Criminal Charges Against Corporations § 6(B) (Oct. 10, 2014), available at
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standard that engenders abuse.8 Indeed, the pitfalls of the current privilege
regime has led to the proposal of many solutions, including: the separation
of legal and business roles within corporations, 9 enactment of federal
legislation to codify privilege rules,10 and alterations to federal common
law.11 Most recently, the D.C. Circuit of Appeals offered an anomalous
interpretation of the current standard, further demonstrating that this area is
fraught with conflict and primed for change.12
Part I of this Note discusses the problems raised by hybrid counsel’s
invocation of attorney-client privilege. Part II provides a general overview
of the current attorney-client privilege standard used by federal courts. Part
III assesses the viability of proposed improvements to the current standard.
Part IV delves into the need for a new approach, one that provides for
greater certainty and creates a more coherent framework. Part V provides a
recent snapshot of the shifting legal landscape. Finally, Part VI proposes
action steps for better addressing the problem of attorney-client privilege in
corporate settings.
I. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Hybrid counsel inevitably performs business and legal functions alike
making it difficult to determine in which capacity the corporate employee
operates.13 This often blurry line opens the door to abuse,14 in which hybrid
counsel invokes privilege where it otherwise may not apply. 15 Further
adding to this danger, the judicial exercise of distinguishing between legal
and non-legal functions often leads to confusion, controversy, and tension
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/documents/reports/1999/charging-corps.PDF. See also
Memorandum from Mark R. Filip, Deputy Attorney Gen., Dep’t of Justice: Principles of Federal
Prosecution of Business Organizations to Heads of Dep’t Components and U.S. Attorneys,
U.S.A.M. §§ 9-28.700 (Aug. 28, 2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/documents/corp-
charging-guidelines.pdf.
8. See Stassberg, supra note 3.
9. See John B. McNeece IV, The Ethical Conflicts of the Hybrid General Counsel and Chief
Compliance Officer, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 677 (2012).
10. See Timothy P. Glynn, Federalizing Privilege, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 59, 63–64 (2002).
11. See Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege: The Eroding Concept of Confidentiality
Should Be Abolished, 47 DUKE L.J. 853 (1998).
12. See In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 756 F.3d 754 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (discussed infra).
13. Communications made by attorneys rendering legal advice are entitled to privilege, while
communications serving predominantly non-legal purposes are generally not protected. See
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 392 (1981) (holding privilege attaches where
corporate counsel is sought to render legal advice). See also In re Cnty. of Erie, 473 F.3d 413, 419
(2d Cir. 2007) (“[T]he question usually is whether the communication was generated for the
purpose of obtaining or providing legal advice as opposed to business advice.”).
14. See Stassberg, supra note 3.
15. See McNeece, supra note 9, at 686 (“[C]ourts have hinted at the difficulty of determining
its application, noting that ‘the day-to-day involvement of corporate counsel in the business of the
company ‘may blur the line between legal and non-legal communications.’”) (citing Sally R.
Weaver, Ethical Dilemmas of Corporate Counsel: A Structural and Contextual Analysis, 46
EMORY L.J. 1023, 1028 (1997)).
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amongst parties—hampering the efficiency of litigation and related
investigations.16
Moreover, as commentators appropriately recognize, hybrid counsels
face considerable ethical dilemmas over their conflicting positions.17 One
commentator has described this tension in situations where general counsel
also serves as a compliance officer:
General Counsel must maintain the client’s confidentiality; in this case the
Counsel’s clients are the corporation and its agents. Meanwhile, the
[Compliance Officer], in following his fiduciary duty, must report
compliance violations, and . . . the potential for compliance violations.
There is thus a conflict between proper fiduciary conduct and required
confidentiality. Further, the Compliance Officer’s focus and attention goes
to what has already been done and makes corrections. In contrast, the
modern General Counsel has a legal and management role that creates the
very programs the Compliance Officer will review.18
Given the, at times, conflicted interests of legal counsel and corporate
officers, the specter of improper invocation of privilege is especially salient
in business administration.19
In light of this, clearer standards are necessary for determining which
communications deserve privilege and which do not. 20 Rather than
receiving broad discretion to invoke privilege, hybrid counsel should not be
entitled to attorney-client privilege in investigative fact-finding, where legal
advice is neither rendered nor expected. Factual findings arising from these
communications should remain open to discovery without the specter of
attorney-client privilege looming large. This is not to say that such
communications must always lose privilege. Rather, privilege may remain
where, for example, outside counsel is retained—thereby sanitizing the
problematic involvement of hybrid counsel.21
16. JENNIFER POPPE ET AL., PROTECTING THE IN-HOUSE ATTORNEY CLIENT PRIVILEGE
(2011), available at https://utcle.org/ecourses/OC4950/get-asset-file/asset_id/22343
(“[U]ncertainty arises, in part, because applying the attorney-client privilege and work product
doctrine raises intensely fact-specific questions.”).
17. See Sally R. Weaver, Ethical Dilemmas of Corporate Counsel: A Structural and
Contextual Analysis, 46 EMORY L.J. 1023 (1997).
18. McNeece, supra note 9, at 677–78.
19. In re Cnty. of Erie, 473 F.3d 413, 419 (2d Cir. 2007) (“The issue usually arises in the
context of communications to and from corporate in-house lawyers who also serve as business
executives.”).
20. Indeed, certainty is one of the most important features for attorney-client privilege. See
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981) (“But if the purpose of the attorney–client
privilege is to be served, the attorney and client must be able to predict with some degree of
certainty whether particular discussions will be protected.”).
21. “Our protection of confidential client communications through privilege is premised on the
assumption that this is essential to vigorous representation of clients.” Stassberg, supra note 3, at
418.
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This endeavor requires amending the “predominant purpose” test used
by many courts in deciding whether attorney-client privilege attaches.22
Where hybrid counsel is involved, emphasizing whether legal advice was
in-fact rendered or expected is necessary for ensuring that privileges are not
abused. The aim is to provide greater guidance for practitioners and depart
from the multi-tiered analyses of the predominant purpose test relied upon
by courts today.23 By focusing on whether legal advice was rendered and/or
expected, courts can avoid the troublesome contextual complexities inherent
in the current approach.
At the same time, institutional mechanisms should be leveraged to
ensure that crucial non-privileged facts reach the light of day and are not
immune from discovery. This entails the creation and use of independent
arbiters of the law who can make determinations as to underlying facts,
much like magistrate judges in federal courts, or arbitrators resolving
disputes. 24 This new institutional mechanism serves the interests of
attorney-client privilege by preserving confidentiality and satisfying the
need for factual findings.25
II. CURRENT STANDARD FOR ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
A. PRIVILEGE&THE PREDOMINANT PURPOSE TEST
In assessing privilege within the corporate context, courts generally
look at the predominant purpose of a communication, the context in which
legal advice is rendered, and whether documents are obtained and/or
created in anticipation of litigation. 26 Specifically, for attorney-client
privilege to attach, courts require: “(1) a communication between client and
counsel that (2) was intended to be and was in fact kept confidential, and
22. Cnty. of Erie, 473 F.3d at 419.
23. Id.
24. This institutional measure, theoretically, would operate independently of the courts and
with the consent of both parties. While the decision would not be binding, it could offer a useful
guide in order for parties to ensure the efficiency of litigation proceedings.
25. See Dombrowski v. Bell Atl. Corp., 128 F. Supp. 2d 216, 219 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (finding
attorney-client privilege should not “insulate underlying facts from the light of day”).
26. See Cnty. of Erie, 473 F.3d at 413 (applying the predominant purpose test); MSF Holding,
Ltd. v. Fiduciary Trust Co. Int’l, No. 03 Civ. 1818PKLJCF, 2005 WL 3338510, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 7, 2005) (examining the surrounding context of the communication, including whether the
attorney engaged in legal analysis); Geller v. N. Shore Long Island Jewish Health Sys., No. Civ.
10-170 ADS ETB, 2011 WL 5507572, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2011) (examining the surrounding
context in order to determine if in-house counsel acted as an agent of outside counsel in
preparation for trial); United States ex rel. Frazier v. IASIS Healthcare Corp., No. 2:05–cv–766–
RCJ, 2012 WL 130332 (D. Ariz. Jan. 10, 2012) (declining to attach privilege where a compliance
officer never held himself out as an attorney, nor acted on behalf of the legal department); United
States ex rel. Parikh v. Premera Blue Cross, No. Civ. 01-476P, 2006 WL 3733783, at *1 (W.D.
Wash. Dec. 15, 2006) (no privilege found where corporate employees did not know a compliance
officer acted as a “representative of the legal department”).
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(3) was made for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal advice.”27
Under this standard, a privileged communication must serve the
predominant purpose of rendering legal advice.28
Under the predominant purpose test, the purpose of a communication
becomes the most crucial factor in assessing privilege. If a
communication’s predominant purpose is to provide legal advice, attorney-
client privilege is likely to attach.29 In making such determinations courts
must consider the surrounding context of the communication. 30 This
contextual assessment demands inquiry into, among other things: whether
counsel’s job functions were predominantly legal, whether the focus of
counsel’s communication was to prepare for trial, and whether there was
any expectation of confidentiality.31 These different ad-hoc considerations
create a convoluted framework that not only creates an excruciating need
for judicial oversight, but muddles the field for practitioners.32
The predominant purpose test has long been a part of attorney-client
privilege jurisprudence and much of the current law is owed to Upjohn v.
United States. 33 As announced by the United States Supreme Court in
Upjohn, communications made “at the direction of corporate superiors in
order to secure legal advice from counsel” are privileged.34 In Upjohn, the
petitioner, a pharmaceutical company, investigated suspect payments made
by a subsidiary for the benefit of foreign officials.35 Petitioner’s attorneys
sent questionnaires to foreign managers seeking detailed information
concerning the suspect payments. 36 Petitioner’s General Counsel
subsequently conducted interviews in conjunction with the questionnaire.37
When these documents were requested by the government, petitioner later
refused to reveal the questionnaire answers and interview notes, invoking
attorney-client privilege. 38 The Supreme Court ultimately found the
questionnaires and interview notes were protected by attorney-client
privilege.39
27. Cnty. of Erie, 473 F.3d at 419. Accord Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency v. UBS Americas Inc., No.
11 CIV. 5201 DLC, 2013 WL 1700923, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2013).
28. Cnty. of Erie, 473 F.3d at 419.
29. Id.
30. See generally Prince v. Madison Square Garden L.P., 240 F.R.D. 126, 126–28 (S.D.N.Y.
2007) (noting the shift from ordinary internal investigation to investigation for the purposes of
preparing for litigation); Geller, 2011 WL 5507572, at *3 (noting that documents prepared in
routine business operations are not entitled to privilege).
31. IASIS, 2012 WL 130332, at *1–3 (examining contextual factors); Parikh, 2006 WL
3733783, at *6–8 (analyzing facts surrounding communications made by an attorney).
32. See Stassberg, supra note 3.
33. See generally Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 394 (1981).
34. Id. (emphasis added).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 386–87.
37. Id. at 387.
38. Id. at 388.
39. Id. at 394 (suggesting that counsel acted in their legal capacity).
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As set forth in Upjohn, persuasive factors in determining privilege
include: (i) counsel acting as a lawyer; (ii) involvement of counsel at the
direction of corporate superiors; and (iii) communications for the purposes
of rendering legal advice.40 Although these factors provide some guidance,
Upjohn did “not undertake to draft a set of rules,” but rather decided that
privilege, “should be determined on a case-by-case basis.”41 This has left
the law somewhat unsettled,42 particularly in instances where it is unclear
whether counsel performs legal or non-legal functions.43
B. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE POST-UPJOHN
In the wake of Upjohn, courts refined their standards for assessing
attorney-client privilege, giving rise to the predominant purpose test as it is
used today. 44 Courts, such as the Second Circuit, strictly require that
claimants show privileged communications bear the predominant purpose
of rendering legal advice.45 For example, in In re County of Erie, a class of
arrested persons alleged they were subjected to unconstitutional strip
searches and motioned to compel the discovery of e-mails between county
attorneys and various officials.46 At issue was “whether the communications
were made for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal advice as
opposed to advice on policy.”47 The court determined that the e-mails in
question were sent for the predominant purpose of providing legal advice
because they included “a lawyer’s assessment of Fourth
Amendment requirements . . . .”48
Although County of Erie involved government officials, its analysis in
distinguishing between legal and non-legal advice is particularly relevant
when considering the dual roles served by hybrid counsel.49 The Second
40. Id. (“The communications at issue were made by Upjohn employees to counsel for Upjohn
acting as such, at the direction of corporate superiors in order to secure legal advice from
counsel.”).
41. Id. at 396.
42. John E. Sexton, A Post-Upjohn Consideration of the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege,
57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443, 464 n.91 (1982) (“Such critics note that corporate clients consulted with
their attorneys frequently in recent years in spite of the fact that the definition of the corporate
privilege was unsettled.”).
43. Particularly when hybrid counsel is involved. The difficulty in discerning where privilege
attaches arises because of the complexity of drawing a line between business and legal advice. See
In re Cnty. of Erie, 473 F.3d 413, 421 (2d Cir. 2007) (“In short, an attorney’s dual legal and non-
legal responsibilities may bear on whether a particular communication was generated for the
purpose of soliciting or rendering legal advice . . . .”).
44. See id. at 413; In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482, 487–488 (2d Cir. 1982); United States
ex rel. Parikh v. Premera Blue Cross, No. Civ. 01-476P, 2006 WL 3733783, at *6–7 (W.D. Wash.
Dec. 15, 2006); Raba v. Suozzi, No. Civ. 06-1109(DRH)(AKT), 2007 WL 128817, at *4
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2007).
45. Cnty. of Erie, 473 F.3d at 419.
46. Id. at 415.
47. Id. at 419.
48. Id. at 422.
49. See Sexton, supra note 42.
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Circuit even recognized the importance of this distinction where in-house
counsel is involved.50 As set forth in County of Erie, when in-house counsel
renders advice that is not predominantly legal, these communications are
unlikely to be privileged.51 However, the actual application of this standard
is easier in theory than practice.52
When a communication involves an attorney who serves both as legal
counsel and non-legal corporate officer, there are often two purposes: (i) the
collection of factual information for business purposes, and (ii) the
collection of factual information for rendering legal advice. 53 Here, the
predominant purpose test is frustrated; there will always be two purposes to
the communication, both to provide business advice and to render legal
advice. This problematic dual purpose brings to light the challenging
applications of the predominant purpose test. Determining the predominant
purpose of a communication requires ad-hoc contextual analyses that render
determinations of privilege unpredictable and dramatically fact-specific.
Further adding to the confusion is an ambiguous and contested
definition of what qualifies as legal advice. Under the predominant purpose
test, determining the purpose of a given communication naturally turns on
the meaning of legal advice. 54 As defined by one court, legal advice
“involves the interpretation and application of legal principles to guide
future conduct or to assess past conduct. It requires a lawyer to rely on legal
education and experience to inform judgment.”55 Where in-house counsel
serves dual functions, privileged communications must involve interpreting
and applying legal principles. 56 Stated another way, in order for a
communication to be protected by privilege, an attorney’s advice depends
“principally on knowledge of or application of legal requirements or
principles, rather than expertise in matters of commercial practice.”57 In the
corporate context, a lawyer’s “recommendation of a policy that complies
(or better complies) with [a] legal obligation—or that advocates and
promotes compliance, or oversees implementation of compliance
50. Cnty. of Erie, 473 F.3d at 419 (“The issue usually arises in the context of communications
to and from corporate in-house lawyers who also serve as business executives. So the question
usually is whether the communication was generated for the purpose of obtaining or providing
legal advice as opposed to business advice.”).
51. Id. at 421.
52. Id. at 420–21 (“The predominant purpose of a communication cannot be ascertained by
quantification or classification of one passage or another; it should be assessed dynamically and in
light of the advice being sought or rendered, as well as the relationship between advice that can be
rendered only by consulting the legal authorities and advice that can be given by a non-lawyer.”).
53. MSF Holding, Ltd. v. Fiduciary Trust Co. Int’l, No. 03 Civ. 1818PKLJCF, 2005 WL
3338510, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2005) (“In-house counsel often fulfill the dual role of legal
advisor and business consultant.”).
54. Id.
55. Cnty. of Erie, 473 F.3d at 419–20.
56. Id.
57. MSF Holding, 2005 WL 3338510, at *1.
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measures—is legal advice.”58 While this appears clear enough on its own,
when business advice is included in a communication, the ability to discern
legal advice becomes increasingly difficult.59
C. PREDOMINANT PURPOSE&CONTEXTUALANALYSES
In instances where the distinction between legal and non-legal advice is
unclear, such as transactional due diligence investigations, courts will
scrutinize the communication’s surrounding context.60 Context factors into
the analysis because the purpose of a particular communication is
“informed by the overall needs and objectives that animate the client’s
request for advice.” 61 Examining context allows courts to determine
whether “an attorney is consulted in a capacity other than as a lawyer.”62
This is especially significant when hybrid counsel acts as a compliance
officer. Despite formal legal training, a compliance officer may never be
tasked with rendering legal advice. Instead, he may only be asked to
conduct routine investigations and/or internal audits devoid of legal
advice. 63 This is distinct from instances where a lawyer must directly
“assess compliance with a legal obligation.” 64 Consequently, courts
evaluate the context of communications in order to better understand their
underlying purpose. 65 Thus, determining privilege in communications
involving hybrid counsel is largely a contextual endeavor.
Context is particularly important when hybrid counsel, acting as a
compliance officer, conducts an internal investigation.66 In these instances,
the surrounding circumstances of the investigation largely dictate whether
privilege applies.67 For example, the purpose of an investigation may shift:
from preliminary fact finding to rendering legal advice. 68 In Prince v.
Madison Square Garden L.P., defendant’s attorney, acting as a compliance
officer, conducted an internal investigation after an employee filed various
complaints.69 While the court ordered discovery of the initial investigation,
investigative materials following the initiation of the lawsuit were
58. Cnty. of Erie, 473 F.3d at 422.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 421.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 422.
65. See generally United States ex rel. Frazier v. IASIS Healthcare Corp., No. 2:05–cv–766–
RCJ, 2012 WL 130332, at *5–9 (D. Ariz. Jan. 10, 2012) (discussing a lawyer’s conduct in order to
determine privilege).
66. See Prince v. Madison Square Garden L.P., 240 F.R.D. 126, 126 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(discussing counsel’s role in an internal investigation).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 127.
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privileged.70 As the court noted, “at some point, the purpose and focus of
the investigation had to have shifted from an internal investigation . . . to an
investigation for the purposes of mounting a legal defense.”71 Prince shows
that internal investigations are not automatically privileged and courts will
assess the surrounding circumstances, such as the timing and purpose of the
investigation. 72 When litigation becomes imminent, communications in
internal investigations are likely privileged.73 As is evident, context largely
informs determinations of attorney-client privilege. This suggests the
importance of emphasizing the expectation of legal advice as a factor within
the predominant purpose test.
In facts analogous to Prince, Geller v. North Shore Long Island Jewish
Health System held that investigative communications were privileged
because the defendant’s Chief Compliance Officer acted as an agent of
defense counsel that was retained for the purposes of conducting the
investigation. 74 Prince and Geller reveal that internal investigations
conducted by compliance officers (or their agents) are not entitled to
privilege by default. Rather, courts must consider the circumstances
surrounding the investigation.75 This supports the contention that factual
investigations conducted by counsel serving dual roles should not
automatically be entitled privilege unless legal advice is actually rendered
or expected.
Courts also examine the surrounding circumstances of a communication
when business advice is involved and the predominant purpose of the
communication.76 In United States v. Ackert, an investment firm proposed a
transaction that would reduce the defendant’s federal income tax liability.
The defendant’s Senior Vice President and Tax Counsel conducted research
and advised the company regarding the tax implications of the proposed
investment. In light of the business investment and financial nature of the
tax advice, the defendant “failed to demonstrate a basis for asserting its
attorney-client privilege.” 77 Accordingly, the communications were
predominantly business related and not entitled to privilege.78
Similar to Ackert, United States v. Adlman found persuasive the fact
that a tax consultant conducting due diligence was predominantly
70. Id. at 128.
71. Id.
72. Id. (“Whether or not there were two completely separate investigations, at some point, the
purpose and focus of the investigation had to have shifted from an internal investigation in
response to Prince’s claims to an investigation for the purposes of mounting a legal defense
against any such claims.”).
73. Geller v. N. Shore Long Island Jewish Health Sys., No. Civ. 10-170 ADS ETB, 2011 WL
5507572, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2011).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See United States v. Ackert, 169 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 1999).
77. Id. at 140.
78. Id. at 139–40.
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responsible for “auditing, accounting, and advisory services,” as opposed to
providing legal services.79 The consultant’s “billing statements lump[ed] the
work done in [his] consultation together with other accounting and advisory
services,” giving rise to the presumption that his advice was predominantly
financial. 80 Contextual considerations like those found in Ackert and
Adlman weigh heavy in determining the purpose of a communication and
whether privilege applies. Such ad-hoc factual considerations reveal the
grey areas of the current regime and its unpredictable outcomes.
Further adding to the contextual analyses of the predominant purpose
test, scrutiny is also given to the nature of the employment position held by
counsel. 81 In United States ex rel. Frazier v. IASIS Healthcare Corp.,
plaintiff alleged violations of the False Claims Act against his former
employer, IASIS, where he served as a compliance officer. 82 Although
plaintiff was a trained attorney and the corporation paid for his “bar fees
and paid for [his] continuing legal education courses,” communications
between IASIS employees and the plaintiff were not privileged.83 As the
court found, plaintiff was never a “member of, nor reported to, the legal
department.”84 Furthermore, plaintiff and his subordinate personnel at the
corporation “were autonomous from the general counsel’s office.” 85
Plaintiff did not in fact operate as counsel; when he learned of a legal issue
“he referred the employee to the Legal Department.” 86 IASIS shows
surrounding circumstances may indicate hybrid counsel did not operate in a
legal capacity, giving rise to no attorney-client privilege.87
Other courts have examined whether allegedly privileged
communications were “undertaken by non-attorneys,” or employees, “with
no legal background.”88 In Fitzpatrick v. American International Group,
plaintiffs challenged the privileged status of all documents described in
defendants’ privilege logs.89 At issue was the fact “defendants’ in-house
counsel held business as well as legal titles ‘and performed significant
business functions.’”90 Fitzpatrick found that companies may not insulate
communications from discovery merely because they involve attorneys.
79. United States v. Adlman, 68 F.3d 1495, 1500 (2d Cir. 1995).
80. Id.
81. See generally United States ex rel. Frazier v. IASIS Healthcare Corp., No. 2:05–cv–766–
RCJ, 2012 WL 130332, at *1 (D. Ariz. Jan. 10, 2012).
82. Id.
83. Id. at *2–3.
84. Id. at *2.
85. Id. at *3.
86. Id.
87. See id.
88. U.S. Postal Serv. v. Phelps Dodge Ref. Corp., 852 F. Supp. 156, 160 (E.D.N.Y. 1994)
(individuals who are not attorneys may serve as agents of an attorney).
89. Fitzpatrick v. Am. Int’l Grp., No.10 Civ. 142 (MHD), 2011 WL 350287, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 1, 2011).
90. Id. (internal citation omitted).
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Rather, a court inquires into the position held by an employee when
assessing whether they acted in a business or legal capacity. Much like
Fitzpatrick, other courts look at whether an attorney authored an allegedly
privileged communication. 91 In Louisiana Municipal Police Employees
Retirement System v. Sealed Air Corp., the District Court of New Jersey
distinguished a separate case based on the fact that “the document in dispute
was not authored by an attorney,” and “the document was the result of an
investigation into the business purposes behind the termination of a
contractual relationship.”92 Accordingly, counsel’s level of legal training,
job description, and employment history are all relevant to determining the
predominant purpose of a communication.93 This creates layer upon layer of
different analytical tiers that, in the end, form a complex and convoluted
picture—neither providing a clear rule nor serving the interests of justice.
D. EXPECTATIONS OFCONFIDENTIALITY
A court’s consideration of a communication’s predominant purpose
does not end with assessing the employment position of the attorney
invoking privilege. Courts also look to whether there is an expectation of
confidentiality. Under this prong, it is clear that if “confidentiality [is] not
intended . . . privilege [does] not attach.”94 Expectations of confidentiality
are central concerns when hybrid counsel provides legal and non-legal
advice.95 In IASIS, the company’s compliance officer never indicated his
interactions with employees “were privileged, nor did [he] ever form any
impression that persons [he] interacted with believed [their] conversations
were privileged.”96 Thus, despite being a professionally trained attorney, the
compliance officer’s communications were not privileged.97 In accord with
IASIS, the Western District Court of Washington found in Premera that no
privilege existed where employees interviewed by its Chief Compliance
Officer were neither informed that the officer acted on behalf of the legal
department, nor told that the interview was conducted for the purposes of
rendering legal advice. 98 Premera held that unless employees were
instructed that their interviews were “part of a legal investigation” and that
91. La. Mun. Police Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Sealed Air Corp., 253 F.R.D. 300, 308 (D.N.J. 2008)
(“[T]he document in dispute was not authored by an attorney nor did it provide legal advice.”).
92. Id.
93. United States ex rel. Frazier v. IASIS Healthcare Corp., No. 2:05–cv–766–RCJ, 2012 WL
130332, at *3 (D. Ariz. Jan. 10, 2012) (“Pursuant to the discussions at oral argument, the Court
finds that Frazier did not have an attorney-client relationship with IASIS. Frazier was a
compliance officer for IASIS and was not IASIS’s attorney.”).
94. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Sept. 15, 1983, 731 F.2d 1032, 1037 (2d
Cir. 1984).
95. IASIS, 2012 WL 130332, at *2–3.
96. Id. at *3.
97. Id.
98. United States ex rel. Parikh v. Premera Blue Cross, No. Civ. 01-476P, 2006 WL 3733783,
at *1 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 15, 2006).
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the compliance officer was “a representative of the legal department,”
privilege would not attach. 99 IASIS and Premera show that courts
examining the context of a communication look to whether there was an
expectation of attorney-client confidentiality.
One additional consideration is whether confidentiality is diminished
when multiple personnel are copied on what is alleged to be a privileged
communication—destroying confidentiality and/or any expectation of
confidentiality.100 Indeed, among communications where non-attorneys and
third parties are copied, there is a presumption that confidentiality does not
exist. 101 Courts recognize that a communication “sent to a third party
ordinarily removes the cloak of confidentiality necessary for protection
under the attorney-client privilege.” 102 In U.S. Postal Service v. Phelps
Dodge Refining Corp., plaintiff brought action against a corporate vendor
alleging breach of contract.103 In discovery, the magistrate judge determined
attorney-client privilege applied only if the communications were “intended
to be confidential.” 104 If “a document [is] prepared for purposes of
simultaneous review by legal and non-legal personnel, it cannot be said that
the primary purpose of the document is to secure legal advice.”105 Just as
allowing third party access to confidential communications bars privilege, a
corporation cannot secure privilege merely by copying counsel to the
communication. 106 The mere fact an attorney is included in a
communication does not necessarily confer privilege protection. Phelps
reveals the narrow construction of attorney-client privilege, a crucial
consideration in assessing how to better address findings of privilege where
hybrid counsel is involved.
As reflected by extensive case law, a court’s analysis of privilege is a
fact intensive inquiry conducted on an ad-hoc, case-by-case basis. 107
Whether attorney-client privilege applies to a communication largely
depends upon the purpose of a given communication, and is informed by
the circumstances in which that communication arises. These factors
confirm the highly contextual nature of attorney-client privilege analyses.
Where counsel serves both legal and non-legal functions, the layered
analyses of the predominant purpose test prove to be a strenuous exercise of
judicial oversight—further suggesting the predominant purpose test is ready
for amendment.
99. Id. at *8.
100. See U.S. Postal Serv. v. Phelps Dodge Ref. Corp., 852 F. Supp. 156, 160 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 162 (internal citations omitted).
103. Id. at 158.
104. Id. at 163.
105. United States v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 66 F.R.D. 206, 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
106. U.S. Postal Serv. v. Phelps Dodge Ref. Corp., 852 F. Supp. 156, 163–64 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
107. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 396 (1981).
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III. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE
There are several proposed alternative approaches to attorney-client
privilege where hybrid counsel is involved. Perhaps the most powerful, and
realistic, is the proposal that the conflicting roles of hybrid counsel be
divided amongst different individuals within the corporation. 108 For
example, where counsel serves as both in-house attorney and compliance
officer, the “compliance and legal functions should be separated. Conflicts
between required maintenance of confidentiality and required disclosures,
different groups to which fiduciary duties are owed, and practical
considerations demonstrate the ethical problems with a hybrid position.” 109
While this is a laudable solution that has taken effect in practice,110 it does
not wholly address the continuing legal issue facing judges who must rule
on questions of privilege, or litigants that face insurmountable difficulties in
obtaining necessary facts. Furthermore, it may still benefit organizational
interests to employ hybrid counsel in order to maintain attorney-client
benefits that are otherwise unavailable. By reshaping the predominant
purpose test, focusing the analysis on whether legal advice is rendered or
expected, organizations have further incentive to separate the legal from
non-legal roles—as privilege will less often apply to hybrid counsel..
Another proposal is the federal codification of privilege rules through
legislation.111 As posited by Professor Timothy P. Glynn, “[f]ederalizing
privilege is the answer. To achieve reasonable certainty, we must abandon
our multi-jurisdictional, common-law approach in favor of a national,
codified solution. That leads inevitably to Congress. Congress has the
capacity and power to enact legislation that provides clear, unqualified, and
generally applicable privilege protections.”112 Although Professor Glynn’s
thesis is aimed at privilege en masse, his proposition extends into the realm
of hybrid counsel. Federalizing privilege is indeed a step toward improving
the disparate common law rules governing attorney-client privilege.113 As
Professor Glynn’s approach suggests, federalizing privilege could best
108. McNeece, supra note 9, at 694 (“The separation of compliance and legal functions is
developing into industry best practice.”).
109. Id.
110. Michael Volkov, An Independent CCO Is A Compliance Program Requirement,
CORRUPTION, CRIME & COMPLIANCE (Apr. 8, 2013),
http://corruptioncrimecompliance.com/2013/04/an-independent-cco-is-a-compliance-program-
requirement/ (“The trend of an independent CCO has now been embraced by scores of leading
companies, including more recently some major players in the finance industry such as Barclays,
HSBC, and J.P. Morgan, which empowered their CCOs by separating them from their respective
legal departments. These innovative solutions to real governance problems only increase the trend
across all industries—an empowered chief compliance officer creates a significant check and
balance against misconduct.”).
111. Glynn, supra note 10, at 63–64.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 59.
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address discrepancies among common law applications of privilege by
promoting uniformity, clarity, and efficiency. 114 However, federalizing
privilege does not expel the internal tensions of invoking privilege where
hybrid counsel is involved. And, as recent history shows, reliance upon
Congress is a bold, if not hopeless, leap of faith.115 Amendments to the
common law of attorney-client privilege are just as effectively addressed
through both corporate best practices—i.e., separating the roles of counsel
and officers—and judicial rulemaking.116
Other, more extreme, commentators have even called for the abolition
of the confidentiality requirement of attorney-client privilege. 117 As
suggested by one commentator, confidentiality “should be abandoned as a
requirement for the attorney-client privilege because compliance with it
generates significant unnecessary costs in the preservation of the secrecy,
the proof of that preservation, and the resolution of disputes surrounding
it.”118 This proposal is simply too far-fetched, ill advised, and does not
prove helpful within the corporate context. Of particular concern is the
prospect that abolishing the confidentiality requirement would lead to
unfettered third-party disclosures, rendering the invocation of attorney-
client privilege frivolous. 119 While Rice is correct that abolishing the
confidentiality requirement could cut costs incurred in preserving
“secrecy,” his solution does not address the fundamental issue where hybrid
counsel is involved: that important factual findings will remain concealed
under a veil of undeserving privilege.120
Foreign jurisdictions may also provide further guidance. Notably, the
European Union does not attach attorney-client privilege to in-house
counsel, regardless of the legal or non-legal functions they serve.121 While
abolishing attorney-client privilege for in-house counsel is an extreme
change from the current privilege regime, it at least suggests the possibility
of a normative change in social attitudes regarding the roles and privileges
of hybrid counsel.122 If we recognize the inherent tensions and conflicted
114. Id. at 134–35.
115. See Kia Makarechi, Congress on Track to Be the Worst Ever at Passing Laws, VANITY
FAIR (Sept. 2, 2014, 10:32 AM), http://www.vanityfair.com/online/daily/2014/09/worst-congress-
ever.
116. For example, augmenting the predominant purpose test as suggested here.
117. Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege: The Eroding Concept of Confidentiality Should Be
Abolished, 47 DUKE L.J. 853 (1998).
118. Id. at 861, 897–98.
119. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of Phil., 951 F.2d 1414, 1428 (3d Cir. 1991)
(“A disclosure to a third party waives the attorney-client privilege unless the disclosure is
necessary to further the goal of enabling the client to seek informed legal assistance.”).
120. Rice, supra note 117, at 861.
121. See Joined Cases T-125 & T-253/03, Akzo Nobel Chems. Ltd. v. Comm’n of the Eur.
Cmtys., 2007 E.C.R. II-3532. See also John Gergacz, In-House Counsel and Corporate Client
Communications: Can EU Law After Akzo Nobel and U.S. Law After Gucci Be Harmonized?
Critiques and A Proposal, 45 INT’L L. 817 (2011).
122. See Akzo Nobel Chems. Ltd., 2007 E.C.R. II-3532.
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nature of hybrid counsel, normative assumptions of attorney-client privilege
could shift closer towards the view espoused by European law. 123 This
would have the effect of rendering all communications involving hybrid
counsel unprivileged. Through this shift, privilege would not apply and no
multi-tiered test would be necessary. But, as is evident, the severity of this
shift is unwarranted at this time.
To better address attorney-client privilege where hybrid counsel is
involved, one could adopt a test akin to the work product doctrine.124 The
work product doctrine is relatively straightforward: if a document is created
in anticipation of litigation, privilege is likely to attach. 125 Adding a
requirement that attorney-client privileges arise in anticipation of litigation
presents one way of safeguarding against abusive and manipulative uses of
privilege.126 Analyzing whether a communication arose in anticipation of
litigation could clarify the current attorney-client privilege framework.127 At
the same time, this would depart from precedent established in cases like
Upjohn and County of Erie, where anticipation of litigation was not
required. Adopting the work product doctrine would not extend privilege to
instances where litigation is not anticipated. Adopting the work product
doctrine would have the effect of excessively narrowing attorney-client
privilege.
IV. A NEW APPROACH
Where hybrid corporate counsel is involved, courts should avoid the
multi-tiered analyses of the predominant purpose test. As shown through
extensive case law, the test itself is imprecise, unpredictable, and lends
itself to abuse where attorney-client privilege can be used as a shield against
discovery.128 Given that cases often turn on one or two minute facts,129
attorney-client privilege should be construed narrowly, particularly in light
of its power to render “relevant information undiscoverable.”130 This is
further supported by the general disapproval of manipulative uses of
privilege.131 Indeed, “selective assertion of privilege should not be merely
123. Id.
124. See United States v. Adlman, 68 F.3d 1495, 1495 (2d Cir. 1995).
125. Id. at 1501 (“The work-product rule shields from disclosure materials prepared ‘in
anticipation of litigation’ by a party, or the party’s representative, absent a showing of substantial
need.”).
126. Id.
127. The work-product standard would shift the focus from the predominant purpose of a
communication to the context in which that communication arose, namely, whether such a
communication arose in anticipation of litigation.
128. One only needs to look at the highly contextual analyses applied by courts like the Second
Circuit in County of Erie, or the Supreme Court in Upjohn.
129. See Adlman, 68 F.3d at 1495.
130. In re Cnty. of Erie, 473 F.3d 413, 418 (2d Cir. 2007).
131. Gruss v. Zwirn, No. 09 CIV. 6441 PGG MHD, 2013 WL 3481350, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. July
10, 2013) (“The reasons to reject selective, manipulative and strategic use of evidentiary
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another brush on an attorney’s palette, utilized and manipulated to gain
tactical or strategic advantage.”132
The broad application of the ad-hoc and fact-intensive predominant
purpose test brings with it the pressing concern that non-privileged relevant
information will never see the light of day.133 This consequence thereby
conflicts with the underlying purpose of attorney-client privilege, which
aims to serve “public interests in the observance of law and administration
of justice.”134 While attorney-client privilege should be preserved at all
costs, it should not come at the expense of full factual disclosure where
privilege otherwise does not apply. Accordingly, hybrid counsel should
relay factual investigative communications in which legal advice is neither
rendered nor expected. This is in keeping with the privilege’s historically
narrow construction, as seen in cases following Upjohn.135
One fundamental pitfall of the predominant purpose test is the often-
blurry line between legal and non-legal functions. Although several courts
have addressed this distinction, the distinction itself remains ambiguous.136
“In limiting the protective capacity of the privilege, courts have hinted at
the difficulty of determining its application, noting that ‘the day-to-day
involvement of corporate counsel in the business of the company may blur
the line between legal and non-legal communications.’”137 Considering this
difficulty, a more workable standard must be fashioned.
Regardless of its shortcomings, the predominant purpose test should not
be discarded in its entirety. Rather, by amplifying the analytical force of
whether legal advice is actually rendered and/or expected, this common law
rule would better conform with attorney-client privilege’s limited use and
narrow construction.138 As the predominant purpose test focuses upon the
nature of a given communication, greater emphasis should be placed on
whether legal advice is actually rendered and/or expected.
Some commentators have already noted the issues with privilege begin
with the nature of corporate administration, where “the close working
relationship between management and corporate counsel may create
confusion and uncertainty about the role of corporate counsel in the
privileges are numerous. As an initial matter, because all evidentiary privileges impede the truth-
finding process, they must be narrowly construed.”).
132. Id. at *7.
133. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981) (“[P]rivilege only protects
disclosure of communications; it does not protect disclosure of the underlying facts by those who
communicated with the attorney . . . .”).
134. Id. at 389.
135. Cnty. of Erie, 473 F.3d at 418 (“[W]e construe the privilege narrowly because it renders
relevant information undiscoverable; we apply it ‘only where necessary to achieve its purpose.’”)
(quoting Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976))).
136. McNeece, supra note 9, at 686.
137. Id. (internal citation omitted).
138. Id.
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representation of the organization.”139 The first difficulty is understanding
precisely who counsel serves. As one observer finds, “there is evidence that
the executives and management of many corporations do not understand
this distinction, and believe the representation extends to personal
representation of corporate constituents.” 140 Where hybrid counsel is
involved, the attorney-client relationship becomes evermore convoluted and
is inherently riddled with ethical implications. This, of course, has a
powerful effect when it comes to invoking privilege. The close working
relationship between management and corporate counsel not only creates
confusion, but also serves as a basis for understanding why privilege must
be narrowly construed.
The close working relationship between hybrid counsel and corporate
management provides every incentive for counsel to insulate harmful
documents under a veil of undeserving privilege.141 This naturally reflects
the precarious position of hybrid counsel within corporations.142 Where in-
house counsel serves as a compliance officer, counsel “must perform
internal investigations and maintain oversight over the corporation. This
creates a no-win scenario, as the lawyer needs all the facts in order to
provide the best representation possible, while simultaneously being
required to not divulge information and break privilege.” 143 These
situations strike at the very heart of why the current predominant purpose
test is inadequate where hybrid counsel is involved. If legal counsel must
choose between either obtaining all necessary facts or simultaneously not
divulging information (and breaking privilege), the natural consequence is
that attorneys will obtain the necessary facts, invoke privilege, and shield
relevant factual findings. This scenario should be addressed by amending
the predominant purpose test, to construe privilege narrowly and limit its
application to instances where legal advice is either rendered or expected.
Further supporting the adoption of changes to the predominant purpose
test is that “[a]n attorney who breaks privilege runs the risk of
disbarment.”144 Attorneys acting as compliance officers, for example, “must
become involved when there is noncompliance with an applicable
regulation. But [] General Counsel providing legal advice on a future
project is bound by privilege.” 145 The same conflicted interests come into
139. Id. at 685.
140. Id. (citing Sally R. Weaver, Ethical Dilemmas of Corporate Counsel: A Structural and
Contextual Analysis, 46 EMORY L.J. 1023, 1028 (1997)).
141. Such as the circumstances at issue in United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 243 (2d
Cir. 1989).
142. McNeece, supra note 915, at 686.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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play: hybrid counsel is “placed in a position where privilege precludes any
disclosures, and compliance officer duty mandates them.” 146
One plausible rebuke against amending the predominant purpose test is
the risk that hybrid counsel will continue to use privilege as a shield against
discovery by merely providing some modicum of evidence showing legal
advice was rendered. In these instances, the standard’s relevant contextual
analyses should remain in effect, i.e., expectations of confidentiality will
still be considered in determining whether privilege attaches. This
amendment, then, is in keeping with cases like Upjohn and County of Erie
that narrowly construe privilege. 147 Additionally, this offers further
incentives to corporations to separate legal and non-legal functions.148
Another remaining question is what happens to the rest of the factors
within the predominant purpose test. Under the proposal here, certain
contextual factors remain relevant, such as client expectations and the
nature of counsel’s employment position. However, the most important
prong of the analysis is whether legal advice was rendered and/or expected,
which is also likely to be clearer than determining the overall purpose of the
entire communication. Leaving discretion to courts, albeit with particular
focus on whether legal advice is rendered or expected, the amended test
agrees with Upjohn’s conception of attorney-client privilege as a case-by-
case consideration.149 Indeed, this proposal aims for a feasible and practical
step toward better instructing litigants and courts traversing the murky
terrain of attorney-client privilege.
Skeptics may question whether such changes to the predominant
purpose test implicate constitutional rights, such as the right against self-
incrimination under the Fifth Amendment.150 While constitutional concerns
are always paramount, no constitutional rights are implicated in the
proposed change.151 To be clear, the amendment is limited to the corporate
context where counsel serves legal and non-legal functions as hybrid
counsel. The very aim of the amended rule only bars privilege in instances
where legal advice is neither rendered nor expected during factual
investigations by hybrid counsel. The amendment does not extend so far as
to capture a criminal suspect’s admissions while speaking with counsel.
These communications would still receive the utmost privilege protection,
146. Id.
147. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 392 (1981); In re Cnty. of Erie, 473 F.3d
413, 418 (2d Cir. 2007).
148. United States ex rel. Frazier v. IASIS Healthcare Corp., No. 2:05–cv–766–RCJ, 2012 WL
130332, at *3 (D. Ariz. Jan. 10, 2012).
149. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 396–97.
150. For extensive discussion on the interplay between constitutional rights and attorney-client
privilege, see The Attorney-Client Privilege: Fixed Rules, Balancing, and Constitutional
Entitlement, 91 HARV. L. REV. 464, 485 (1977).
151. The proposed change will neither compel self-incrimination nor reveal the testimonial
confessions of clients.
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particularly when considering that legal advice will almost always be
expected and sought when consulting with defense counsel. It is also crucial
to note that corporate counsels serve the corporation and its agents, not the
individual employees personally. Accordingly, this rule change would not
even reach personal representation in criminal matters. 152 As such, no
constitutional rights are implicated by revealing investigative fact-findings
that are discovered in the course of an internal investigation where legal
advice is neither rendered nor expected.153
The final important element of this proposal is to reinforce institutional
mechanisms that provide somewhat of a fast track to privilege
determinations. This mechanism would function much like a magistrate
judge in federal court or an independent arbitrator. The individual
reviewing contested documents, as a quasi-magistrate, quasi-arbitrator,
could determine which documents are privileged as litigation proceeds in
real time. To be clear, this would not usurp the courts. This solution would
only be available when both parties consent to have a particular document,
or series of documents, reviewed. There are benefits for both sides in this
institutional mechanism. Not only does it offer a fast track—perhaps more
expeditious than submitting all documents for review by a magistrate—it
also offers an independent, impartial third party that guides the process of
litigation in its early stages. Having these privilege rulings at the beginning
of litigation should reduce costs and remove uncertainties from the process.
This institutional mechanism, coupled with the amended predominant
purpose test, would better address the complex privilege issues of hybrid
counsel.
V. FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS
An issue for further consideration revolves around a recent D.C. Circuit
of Appeals case that has the potential to shake attorney-client privilege at its
core.154 In In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., the D.C. Circuit considered
claims of privilege in a case involving contractors that allegedly defrauded
the United States government.155 The plaintiff, Harry Barko, “worked for
[Kellogg Brown & Root], a defense contractor.” 156 “Barko alleged that
[Kellogg Brown & Root] and certain subcontractors defrauded the U.S.
Government by inflating costs and accepting kickbacks while administering
military contracts in wartime Iraq.”157 Barko sought discovery of an internal
investigation conducted by Kellogg Brown & Root’s Law department.158
152. McNeece, supra note 9, at 685.
153. Id.
154. In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 756 F.3d 754 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 756.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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On appeal, the D.C. Circuit considered whether the documents sought in
discovery were entitled to attorney-client privilege. 159 In discussing the
predominant purpose test, the D.C. Circuit decided it was important to
“underscore that the primary purpose test, sensibly and properly applied,
cannot and does not draw a rigid distinction between a legal purpose on the
one hand and a business purpose on the other.” 160 The court rejected a “but
for” reading of the predominant purpose test,161 instead finding that courts
should not strive to find only one “primary purpose in cases where a given
communication plainly has multiple purposes. Rather, it is clearer, more
precise, and more predictable to articulate the test as follows: Was obtaining
or providing legal advice a primary purpose of the communication,
meaning one of the significant purposes of the communication.”162 Kellogg
Brown expands the predominant purpose test beyond its current scope and
departs from the readings of other federal appellate courts.163 This does not
comport with precedent such as Upjohn and opens the door to liberal
applications of privilege—extending to documents with any legal purpose.
Kellogg Brown introduces a new test in attorney-client privilege
jurisprudence: whether seeking legal advice was “one of the
[communication’s] significant purposes.”164 While this test may encourage
clarity in the law, it unreasonably broadens attorney-client privilege. The
test announced in Kellogg Brown is one that can easily lead to abuse in the
corporate context, far beyond what the current predominant purpose test
permits. Adhering to the “one of” test, parties may easily invoke privilege
in undeserving instances. Even when a communication objectively does not
involve the rendering of legal advice, the “one of” test, as proposed in
Kellogg Brown allows for hybrid counsel to assert privilege so long as some
modicum of legal advice is given.165 Thus, the Kellogg Brown decision errs
in construing privilege far too broadly.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 759 (“Under the District Court’s approach, the attorney-client privilege apparently
would not apply unless the sole purpose of the communication was to obtain or provide legal
advice. That is not the law . . . . The District Court’s novel approach to the attorney-client
privilege would eliminate the attorney-client privilege for numerous communications that are
made for both legal and business purposes and that heretofore have been covered by the attorney-
client privilege. And the District Court’s novel approach would eradicate the attorney-client
privilege for internal investigations conducted by businesses that are required by law to maintain
compliance programs, which is now the case in a significant swath of American industry. In turn,
businesses would be less likely to disclose facts to their attorneys and to seek legal advice, which
would ‘limit the valuable efforts of corporate counsel to ensure their client’s compliance with the
law.’ . . . We reject the District Court’s but-for test as inconsistent with the principle of Upjohn . . .
.”) (internal citation omitted).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See In re Cnty. of Erie, 473 F.3d 413 (2d Cir. 2007).
164. Kellogg Brown, 756 F.3d at 760.
165. In many ways, the original decision by the district court represents one solution at one end
of the spectrum (the “but-for” test), and the broader “one of the significant purposes” test, adopted
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Despite its flawed holding, the Kellogg Brown court rightly
acknowledged the need for factual disclosure even where privilege is
properly invoked.166 The court noted that Upjohn “only protects disclosure
of communications; it does not protect disclosure of the underlying facts by
those who communicated with the attorney.”167 The plaintiff in Kellogg
Brown “was able to pursue the facts underlying [Kellogg Brown & Root]’s
investigation. But he was not entitled to [it]’s own investigation files.”168
This suggests a final consideration: that attorney-client privilege may
protect communications so long as the underlying facts within those
communications are divulged during the process of litigation—i.e., the facts
are teased out of the communication.
VI. CONCLUSION
The conflicting interests of hybrid counsel means that courts should be
wary of extending privilege to communications where factual findings
remain concealed and no legal advice is rendered. When in-house counsel
serves non-legal functions and conducts investigative fact-finding, where no
legal advice is rendered or expected, facts arising from these
communications should be left open to discovery, without the potential
shield of attorney-client privilege. In this sense, the predominant purpose
test and its ad-hoc contextual inquiries are not helpful in protecting party
interests or preserving efficiency. To improve privilege within the corporate
context, institutional mechanisms should be strengthened, such as allowing
independent arbiters to review documents in real time. These proposals
better conform to fundamental purpose of attorney-client privilege, namely,
the promotion of “public interests in the observance of law and
administration of justice.”169
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